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+# Economics of Warfare
+
+According to the US Army, engagements are likelier to have a favorable outcome for the attacker if he exercises "surprise, speed, and violence of action".
+
+Is that true?
+
+Why would it be true?
+
+To answer the first question, we could survey the history of warfare and look for supporting examples. I suspect we'd find many.
+
+To answer the second question is a different exercise entirely. Recorded history provides us only with examples of successful applications of the advice, not explanations of *why* the advice tends to work.
+
+_WIP_ One way to approach the question is as an economics problem. The scientific method is a way to measure a phenomenon. In the field of economics, there are tools for reasoning about why things are trueMost people think of economics as a science related exclusively to money, but it's really a set of tools for reasoning about systems of human interaction in our shared physical reality.
+
+Warfare is such a system.
+
+## Scarcity
+
+_WIP_
+
+## Surprise
+
+Let us begin with the tactic of surprise.
+
+Everyone, everywhere, has at some point in their lives been surprised. Surprise is an emotion associated with suddenly experiencing an unexpected reality.
+
+Humans continuously invest in avoiding surprise. The emotion is not only uncomfortable to experience, but the consequences of experiencing anything unexpected tend to be negative more often than positive.
+
+Positive experiences are generally those that are the outcome of prior intentional planning or investment, and so are rarely unexpected or "surprising".
+
+While humans continuously invest in avoiding surprise, the resources they do so with are scarce. Foremost among these scarce resources is time. Humans have a limited amount of time to think about anything, and even have to use time just to think about how they should best use their time.
+
+_WIP_
+to weigh the relative future costs (risks) of being surprised a thing against the cost of preparing for the possiblity that the thing will happen.
+
+Humans have powerful imaginations, and the set of bad things we can imagine that could potentially happen to us is very large. Any given defender has to choose the likeliest among these to invest in protection against, in order to avoid being surprised, and to neutralize (or at least minimize) negative consequences.
+
+The set of things that *could actually* happen is even larger, and includes the set of things that could happen that transcend the imagination of the defender. 
+
+The scarcity in t
+